Description Egalitarianism, the view that equality matters, attracts a great deal of attention amongst contemporary political theorists. And yet it has turned out to be surprisingly difficult to provide a fully satisfactory egalitarian theory. The cutting-edge articles in Egalitarianism move the debate forward.
They are written by some of the leading political philosophers in the field.
Recent issues in the debate over equality are given careful consideration: the distinction between 'telic' and 'deontic' egalitarianism; prioritarianism and the so-called 'levelling down objection' to egalitarianism; whether egalitarian justice should have 'whole lives' or some subset thereof as its temporal focus; the implications of Scanlon's contractualist account of the value of choice for egalitarian justice; and the question of whether non-human animals fall within the scope of egalitarianism and if so, what the implications are.
Numerous 'classic' issues receive a new treatment too: how egalitarianism can be justified and how, if at all, this value should be combined with other values such as desert, liberty and sufficiency; how to define the 'worst off' for the purposes of Rawls' difference principle; Elizabeth Anderson's feminist account of 'equality of relations'; how equality applies to risky choices and, in particular, whether it is justifiable to restrict the freedom of suppliers who wish to release goods that confer different levels of risk on consumers, depending on their ability to pay.
Finally, the implications of egalitarianism and prioritarianism for health care are scrutinized. Table of contents I. Review quote The editors of this book introduce its collection of essays as 'contributions to the ongoing project of developing an adequate egalitarian theory' p. Such a brief review can only hint at the richness and high quality of these contributions by prominent authors in the field. This book should definitely be on the shelves of every egalitarian theorist. Rating details. Book ratings by Goodreads. Goodreads is the world's largest site for readers with over 50 million reviews.
Indeed, luck egalitarianism is an alternative way to develop the emphasis on choice, responsibility, and individual sovereignty that leads some to reject egalitarianism entirely. Cohen argues that the view co-opts these values from the anti-egalitarians. Luck egalitarianism is not opposed to inequality per se; it is opposed to inequalities that have the wrong sort of origins. Inequalities based in brute luck, that is, the type of morally arbitrary factors cited by Rawls innate talents, parentage, starting place in society generate unjust inequalities. But option luck, that is, luck in the outcomes of freely taken risks or gambles, lead to just inequalities.
As with the capabilities approach, luck egalitarianism may be combined with other principles of justice. See Cohen on community. One objection to luck egalitarianism is based in skepticism about free will and moral responsibility. The theory hinges on the moral importance of choice and responsibility. If there is no robust conception of free will and moral responsibility, why think that inequalities caused by our choices are just?
Another worry about the theory is abandonment. Does luck egalitarianism offer no aid to those who suffer because of choices with poor outcomes? If inequalities are just whenever they are caused by choice, then is there no minimum level of well-being guaranteed for all? One sort of response to this worry is combining luck egalitarianism with other political values.
Cohen argues that a commitment to community prohibits inequalities that would be allowed in a purely luck egalitarian system. Kymlicka argues that luck egalitarianism can be combined with social egalitarian views that likewise prohibit some inequalities that might be allowed by luck egalitarianism. Anderson develops a social egalitarian view and is a strong critic of luck egalitarianism. Her conception of democratic equality is not only a development of the capabilities theory but also an explicit rejection of luck egalitarianism.
She thinks that the luck egalitarian focus on brute luck means the theory completely misses the social nature of inequality. Unjust inequality has to do with social relationships. Another question facing those who support luck egalitarianism is how to define equal starting places.
This leads us into the larger issue of what constitutes equality of opportunity. What if there are dramatic inequalities in the opportunities for choice, education, and careers? This is a problem for luck egalitarians, because they need to specify a starting gate conception of equality. It is also a pressing issue for the other conceptions of equality. Dworkin argues that inequalities can be historically justified when persons made their choices from an equivalent set of options.
This commits luck egalitarianism to robust equality of opportunity. However, his standard is difficult to interpret, since citizens can never have a strictly equivalent set of options, unless that set is so restricted that the society is dystopian. There must be some standard to define when their options are fungible or equivalent enough. Answering that problem requires some other standard of value. When do persons have equal opportunities? Equality of opportunity is a natural extension of the descriptive thesis that affirmed the equality of all persons. The descriptive thesis is incompatible with forms of oppression that rule out classes of people from competing for certain positions within society.
A denial of the descriptive thesis entails a denial of a commitment to equality opportunity. But what exactly does equality of opportunity require? It can be understood as ranging from merely formal equality of opportunity to substantive equality of opportunity. The more one approaches the latter, the more one becomes committed to substantive distributive justice.
Formal equality of opportunity requires that desirable positions and resources in society be allocated by open and meritocratic competition. Firms, government agencies, and universities are appropriate candidates for such equality of opportunity. This requires little or no substantive distributive justice. It does require that all citizens can participate in the competition, and that the winners are chosen on the basis of purely meritocratic concerns.
Meritocracy requires that the traits that determine who wins the competition actually predict success in the position. Formal equality of opportunity prohibits allocating positions on the basis of gender, ethnicity, and so on. This deals only with opportunities, not outcomes. It does not address systemic inequalities in who wins the meritocratic competitions. Substantive equality of opportunity addresses both the procedures for allocating positions and the preparation of the candidates that determine their chances of success.
It deals with both fair procedures and the actual outcomes of those procedures. For example, if positions are open on the basis of purely meritocratic competition, but the advantages conferred by wealthy parentage are so overwhelming that only the children of the wealthy win the desirable positions, this is merely formal equality of opportunity. Those who support substantive equality of opportunity argue that the merely formal is morally inadequate. In the past, this was a caste society in which warriors had high prestige and the majority of wealth. The society transitions to a system of formal equality of opportunity.
Under the old order, only the sons of wealthy families were eligible to be chosen as warriors. All others were consigned to poverty and subjugation. Now, warrior positions are allocated under a system that exhibits formal equality of opportunity. Under the new order, there is a meritocratic allocation of the desirable warrior positions. These desirable positions are distributed according to the results of an open, meritocratic, and fair tryout. Rich and poor alike may enter the competition. There is no bias in judging the winners and losers. Stipulate that women may now obtain these positions.
Success in the examination is predictive of success as a warrior, so the system is meritocratic. However, this is all compatible with only the offspring of warriors having adequate nutrition and training to succeed in the competition. Although careers are open to talents, the poor have no chance to cultivate the relevant talents. Even those with the luck to be born with innate ability have their prospects defined by their parentage. Those who were not born to a warrior family cannot succeed. Therefore, the old social hierarchy will persist, even though a strict caste system has been replaced by open, meritocratic procedures that satisfy formal equality of opportunity.
A formal equality of opportunity defender might point out that the long-term outlook for this social hierarchy is made much more tenuous by the implementation of formal equality of opportunity. Other changes to the society could impact the levels of inequality. The dominant positions in society are subject to change over time in a way that they were not under the original caste system.
Still, from the egalitarian perspective, this meritocratic society is unjust. That destabilizing forces can change things under formal equality of opportunity does not redeem the status quo. The current situation is unjust, and destabilizing change would not entail that the next distribution will be just, only that the individuals occupying the dominant and subordinate positions will change. The transition might be to one in which different non-meritocratic attributes correlate with having any chance for success; say, from warrior families to merchant families, or that the offspring of a small set of occupations will be the only ones with a genuine opportunity to succeed.
A perfectionist, someone who thinks that society should maximize the pursuit of some particular conception of the good, could argue that formal equality of opportunity is adequate because the concentration of wealth, which in turn prepares people to flourish as warriors, creates the best set of warriors overall. One can object to this on perfectionist terms that generating the best warriors is not the proper overriding good, or that this system does not generate the best set of warriors or on Rawlsian terms of liberal justice no one conception of the good should be made sovereign in a free society, and no one would agree to this arrangement in the original position.
Suppose the example is shifted slightly. Rather than only the sons of wealthy high caste families having any opportunity to succeed, there is a small amount of social mobility. Some not born into a privileged position win the meritocratic competition. There is not substantive equality of opportunity, but there is both formal equality of opportunity and actual mobility. A supporter of substantive equality of opportunity will still object that it is the strength of the correlation between family background, the resources provided by that background, and obtaining a warrior position is itself adequate evidence of the inadequacy of formal equality of opportunity.
These concerns push one to rely on another metric, such as resources, to attain a substantive, material form of equality of opportunity. A collection of informal social attitudes and practices may also violate equality of opportunity. If women are not seen as capable of being good pilots, then hiring and promotion procedures will lack genuine formal equality of opportunity, even if this is neither inscribed in company policy, in law, or in a caste system. These impediments to equality of opportunity are endemic in contemporary society.
There are more strategies for answering these problems than can possibly be described in this brief article, so we will mention only two that expand upon views already covered. Rawls developed a conception of fair equality of opportunity that undermines the role of class, race, gender, or caste to determine life prospects.
Fair equality of opportunity requires that persons of equivalent talent who expend equivalent effort have equivalent outcomes. Roemer provides a sophisticated luck egalitarian account of equality of opportunity that separates people into different types. The competitions that allocate desirable resources and positions should be designed so that effort is rewarded. The details of this scheme are beyond the scope of this article, but these two views are good starting places for readers who want to research the issue in greater depth.
An obvious form of anti-egalitarianism rejects the descriptive thesis. If persons are not equal, then there is no moral imperative to pursue substantive distributive justice. Sexism, racism, caste discrimination, and so on are obviously not views that lead into egalitarianism. These objections are beyond the scope of this article. A common political objection to egalitarianism is that it is based in envy. None of the theories canvassed in this article are explicitly based in envy, so this objection has more to do with the alleged psychological motivations for becoming an egalitarian rather than criticism of egalitarian arguments themselves.
Persons in the original position want to secure the greatest number of primary goods for themselves. Their choice is not impacted by envy of those who may end up with an even greater share of primary goods. A second political objection is that egalitarianism undermines productivity. If the state redistributes income or other resources, then there is less incentive to be productive. Suppose all the members of a population have x units of your preferred metric of distributive justice, except for one person who has 2x.
Now consider whether it is desirable to transition from that distribution to one in which everyone holds x units. This makes one person worse off and no person better off. The distribution is now equal, but is it preferable? Is it more just? A strict egalitarian can respond that if equality is intrinsically valuable then the distribution is improved in that respect.
They are not strictly committed to concluding that this makes the new distribution preferable overall. That only follows if equality is the overriding or sole value. If equality must be balanced against other values, then egalitarians have an answer to the leveling down objection. A strict egalitarian who thinks equality is instrumental already accepts other values, so they can argue that in these cases equality is not instrumental in bringing about the desired consequences.
The leveling down objection is a threat to views that pursue strict equality. Non-equalizing conceptions of substantive distributive justice avoid the problem. What most theories aim to do is improve the condition of the worst off and thereby lessen inequality, not pursue strict equality unconditionally. Views that prioritize aid to the worst off or support a sufficient minimum floor are not obviously subject to this objection.
Even if one thinks it is morally obligatory to redistribute resources to improve the condition of those who are worse off than others, it does not follow that it is obligatory to destroy resources when that is the only way to achieve distributive equality. Perhaps the most philosophically interesting objections to egalitarianism are themselves based in the descriptive thesis that all persons are in fact equal. One objection is that egalitarian distributive justice is insufficiently sensitive to both deservingness and human agency.
A second is that there is no just way to implement a redistributive scheme that aims towards equality, because doing so violates freedoms and rights that follow from our equality. Strict egalitarianism defines a pattern of equal shares, the various capabilities approaches define patterns involving a sufficient minimum below which persons cannot fall, and the difference principle states that the level of permissible deviation from the baseline of equality is defined by what is necessary to raise the absolute condition of the worst off.
Nozick argues against all patterned conceptions of distributive justice. He claims that according to patterned conceptions of justice, if a given pattern is just, it makes no difference which persons occupy which places in the distribution. Justice is defined in terms of structural features of the pattern, not the identity of those occupying specific places in the pattern.
Yet that seems counterintuitive. Those at the top might deserve their place on the basis of working hard. Inequalities might be generated by the voluntary transfer of goods that took place in a distribution that was already just. Nozick concludes that, rather than favoring a patterned conception of distributive justice, we ought to understand distributive justice in terms of historical entitlements and voluntary transactions. He agrees with Rawls that the distribution of natural talents is not a basis for deservingness, but denies that this means the distribution of those talents and the varying wealth and income derivable from them is arbitrary from the moral point of view.
It is not arbitrary because natural talents are implicated in the normative relationship of self-ownership. Persons own themselves. That includes their native abilities. This means that, by extension, they hold strong entitlements to the property they can obtain by exercising those undeserved talents. Consider the role given to institutional expectations and institutional desert. In other words, entitlement to property is generated by the basic structure of the state.
Institutional expectations ground such entitlements. Therefore, his view is compatible with a conception of private property that is not indifferent to which persons occupy which positions in the distribution. Of course, Nozick, following Locke, thinks individuals can have preinstitutional entitlements, so his view of property rights is much stronger. There is a causal relationship between which persons occupy which positions and the pattern of the total distribution.
The size of the economic pie is defined by which people occupy which places. Switching places would change total productivity and harm the absolute condition of the worst off. The specific pattern depends on myriad factors, and those factors cannot be held constant while you switch the persons occupying the different positions in the pattern. For example, if in a given state greater incentives are required to motivate some of the highly talented to be more productive, you cannot switch their place in the pattern without changing the productivity level.
The hypothetical place switching across identical patterns cannot be implemented. This response also applies to luck egalitarian accounts of distributive justice. For a much stronger desert-based alternative, see Kagan Suppose an actual distribution meets your definition of a just pattern, whatever that may be.
So long as persons can make voluntary transactions purchases, gifts, trades, bequests , the original pattern will be lost. This all happens without exploitation or coercion. The only way to regain the pattern is to for the state to interfere with these voluntary transactions and coercively redistribute the resources. But that is objectionable for two reasons.
First, since the deviation from the initial pattern was entirely voluntary, nobody has a valid objection to the second pattern. It wrongs no one, since every transaction that changed the pattern was consensual. Second, coercive redistribution to retain the original pattern must violate property rights. In the initial distribution, which we stipulate was just, each had a right to their holdings. Through voluntary transfers, the new pattern was generated. But if the transactions were voluntary, the new owners of these resources are as entitled to them as the original owners were.
The original pattern was just and therefore it is neither required nor permissible for the state to redistribute anything. Egalitarian redistribution enforced by the state must violate property rights. No program can pursue substantive distributive justice through redistribution, because such redistribution is unjust. Those rights preclude systems of imposing, retaining, or regaining a specific distributive pattern.
His understanding of equality is incompatible with egalitarianism. Nozick concludes that we should understand distributive justice in formal and historical terms, not in terms of patterning. He then argues for a set of historical principles governing the original acquisition and subsequent transfer of property. Nozick affirms that persons are equal, but this means that each person has equally strong property rights. The descriptive thesis on this view entails a denial of egalitarianism. Egalitarianism can only be pursued by violating the property rights that follow from our equality.
The mistaken belief that economic equality is important in itself leads people to detach the problem of formulating their economic ambitions from the problem of understanding what is most fundamentally significant to them. It influences them to take too seriously, as though it were a matter of great moral concern, a question that is inherently rather insignificant and not directly to the point, namely, how their economic status compares with the economic status of others. In this way the doctrine of equality contributes to the moral disorientation and shallowness of our time.
Frankfurt A person focused on strict egalitarianism evaluates their own life and holdings based on something impersonal and independent of the particular features of their own lives and their own personal needs. Egalitarianism is harmful. However, the egalitarian impulse is really based in something that is of moral importance—the principle that all persons should have a sufficient level of well-being.
It seems clear that egalitarianism and the doctrine of sufficiency are logically independent: considerations that support the one cannot be presumed to provide support also for the other. Yet proponents of egalitarianism frequently suppose that they have offered grounds for their position when in fact what they have offered is pertinent as support only for the doctrine of sufficiency.
Thus they often, in attempting to gain acceptance for egalitarianism, call attention to disparities between the conditions of life characteristic of the rich and those characteristic of the poor. The fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has.
Defenders of equality must show that substantive distributive justice is not captured by concerns over sufficiency alone. We will use Scanlon as a representative example. Scanlon offers five sorts of reasons to be concerned with equality and not merely sufficiency. Some inequalities create humiliating differences in status. One could object that sufficiency is whatever level required to avoid humiliation and shame.
However, the level is sensitive to differences between the better off and worse off rather than being determined by objective or unchanging standards. This means that, contra Frankfurt, we are intrinsically concerned with differences between people, not just that everyone meets some sufficient benchmark. Inequalities can give those who have more an unjust amount of power over others. Social institutions are only fair if there is equality of starting places in society.
Inequality can undermine procedural fairness. We can see this in economic competition, inequality of opportunity, and political influence. Inequalities can be objectionable when they involve failure to treat equally those who have a claim to equal benefit. Just because everyone has a sufficient level of some service or resource provided by the state does not mean that unequal allocation is just.
Inequality can violate the claims of citizens to benefit from the fruits of social cooperation.
This is how Scanlon reads Rawls as egalitarian. The participants in the original position are equal participants. The presumption is that they have an equal claim to the benefits of social cooperation. This is why equality is the benchmark from which inequalities are judged, and only those that benefit everyone are permissible. The primary goods are produced by social cooperation and, contra Nozick, the baseline or benchmark is that every equal citizen has an equal claim to those benefits. For more on the debate between equality, sufficiency, and giving priority to the worst off, see the references for Nagel, Parfit, and Scanlon.
For elucidating commentary on Scanlon, see Wolff Many egalitarians hold a stronger domestic than global view. Redistributive priority is given to fellow citizens over persons in other nations. This, on its face, seems inconsistent or unwarranted. If one is committed to equality, what difference could national borders make?
Is it just for a state to prioritize domestic distributive justice over global distributive justice? As a pure matter of luck egalitarianism, the state into which one is born is a paradigm example of brute luck. The arbitrariness of nationality combined with the universality of the descriptive thesis all persons are equal creates tension with domestic prioritization. On the other hand, if redistributive justice deals with the allocation of goods produced by the cooperation of citizens, then perhaps there is a justification for prioritizing domestic over international redistribution.
Consider an efficiency argument against global egalitarianism. One may be an egalitarian yet argue for domestic priority based on increased costs of sending aid to distant locations, difficulty with managing the efficient distribution on the other end, or epistemic advantages of dealing with local rather than remote issues. Peter Singer argues against the efficiency rationale. Changes in modern transportation, financial systems, and information technology have lessened most of the inefficiencies in aiding far away persons. So on the one hand, it is not egalitarian in the sense of an equal distribution of some metric, but rather egalitarian in the sense of doing away with suffering at the bottom rungs of the global society.
If moral obligations can be global, then perhaps so too can egalitarianism. Proximity is arbitrary in his analysis: someone suffering nearby is no more morally relevant than someone suffering far away. Given the magnitude of global suffering, there is an egalitarian element to his utilitarian calculus. So long as these objectively bad states of affairs are occurring, first world people are obligated to work to prevent them.
This will flatten global inequality. Singer therefore takes the descriptive thesis to require radical, obligatory sacrifice on the part of citizens in first world countries. Given the amount of objectively bad states of affairs in the world, those who are comparatively well off are obligated to reallocate resources to the worst off.
She argues for a right not to be killed unjustly. Global resource inequalities amount to de facto killings. They are unjust, since they can be avoided at reasonable cost. She gives an argument by analogy that highlights the tension between property entitlements and distributive justice. In a lifeboat scenario, one who has excess water and food but withholds it from others, who will die without it, violates their right not to be killed unjustly.
Property entitlements vary in strength in different contexts. She then argues that the planet is no different from a lifeboat, so that those dying from poverty and famine have their right not to be killed unjustly violated. This argument hinges on the contextual variability of property rights and the relative strength of the right not to be killed over property rights.
The right not to be killed trumps property rights, so the redistribution required to avoid these killings is obligatory. Unlike Singer, this does not generalize to an obligation to prevent all objectively bad happenings globally. Redistribution is the means to avoid these killings.
Given these types of arguments for global moral obligations, what can be said in favor of domestic priority in egalitarian redistribution? If distributive equality is a matter of justice, should redistribution be global? As in the discussion of anti-egalitarianism, one obvious objection is to deny that the descriptive thesis holds globally.
A stronger argument is that the demands of egalitarian justice are tied up with institutions and practices that are not global. If matters of distributive justice have to do with coercive redistribution, then perhaps only persons living within the same state fall under egalitarian requirements. If so, global distributive justice would only apply if there were genuinely powerful and coercive global institutions. Egalitarian obligations only arise within a coercive political structure.
That the state holds coercive power over the citizens means that they should each be treated equally and, perhaps, that the state should engage in redistribution to pursue equality of holdings.
Various forms of this view appeal to different features of the state. A similar argument is that redistributive justice has to do with allocating the resources made possible through social cooperation. If so, then the bonds of citizenship matter to distributive justice, and we should treat domestic and international inequality differently. Another domestic-priority view is that egalitarian norms arise among people who share political bonds and obligations, and those attachments are local rather than global. These sorts of objections are not unconditionally opposed to global egalitarianism; they rather object that egalitarianism is tied to certain relationships and institutions that currently are not global.
Some egalitarians counter that the amount of global engagement, cooperation, and institutional entanglement does generate global egalitarian obligations. For example, see Pogge Richard Miller gives a consequentialist argument for domestic prioritization. Too much redistribution directed outside of a particular state can have a destabilizing impact. Even if that state is well off compared to others, as long as it has inequality in its own economy, then those on the internal bottom rungs may become alienated if resources are taken out of their economic system and sent to another country whose most deprived citizens are even more worse off.
The worst-off citizens within the relatively wealthier state are participating in a scheme of social cooperation that benefits the well off, their state engages in egalitarian redistribution, but the redistributive scheme prioritizes the needs of the worst off in other countries. It seems as though this scheme provides benefits to all but the domestic worst off. This can undermine their commitment both to productive labor and the respect for the rule of law.
This in turn harms the state, makes it less stable and productive, and therefore makes it less able to generate external aid. Miller also attempts to transcend the patriotism-cosmopolitanism dispute by universalizing patriotic priority. For the vast majority of people, certain universal human goods are only satisfied in local political communities.
The exceptions are a miniscule small number of global elites. Our need for social interaction and political community is satisfied locally, as we do not share rich attachments with persons across the globe. This changes the inherently arbitrary nature of the state into which one was born into something morally relevant. Combined with the previous consequentialist argument, this means that in order to secure these universal human goods, we need individual states, and within each state we need patriotic priority in redistributive justice.
Each person needs these goods categorically, they can only be provided locally, and they are threatened when the redistributive scheme within a given state does not exhibit patriotic priority. This is all compatible with the descriptive thesis applying globally. On this view the descriptive thesis only requires that we are not insensitive to the suffering of others.
We do have global obligations to assist others, but this does not mean all the demands of distributive justice are all global. A commitment to global equality requires radical, perhaps unrealistic sacrifice. That can be taken as reason to reject global egalitarianism: persons cannot reasonably be expected to bring about global equality.
However, normative principles specify what we ought to do, not what we are comfortable doing. What we ought to do might require a complete change to our way of life.
Ryan Long Email: longr philau. Egalitarianism Are all persons of equal moral worth? See also Moral Egalitarianism. Table of Contents What is Egalitarianism? Equality of What? Equality Domestic or Global? References and Further Reading 1. What is Egalitarianism? Consider three different claims about equality: All persons have equal moral and legal standing. In some contexts, it is unjust for people to be treated unequally on the basis of irrelevant traits. This reason is not necessarily decisive.
The remainder of this article focuses on the following topics: What is the proper egalitarian metric? Once we settle on a metric, are we then concerned with ex ante or outcome equality? In other words, is egalitarianism concerned with a fair allocation of holdings among persons at the starting gate of each life, so that the ensuing competition is fair, or is it concerned with equal life outcomes? Do choice and responsibility matter to this question? What if a given inequality is due to informed and avoidable choices made by the relevant persons?
Can such inequalities be just? Should our shares be determined by our choices and actions? If so, then what is genuine equality—a pattern of distribution in which each person is maximally responsible for their holdings, with the role of luck minimized? Many deny the fundamental equality of persons. Some think men are superior to women, certain races are superior to others, and certain castes should dominate others. If so, there is no general moral imperative to lessen inequality among persons.
Anti-egalitarianism of this sort rejects both 1 and 2. This article will not address such views. The more philosophically compelling anti-egalitarianism stems not from a rejection of 1 but rather from one of the following readings of it: 3 does not follow from 1. Pursuit of 3 is counterproductive or has bad consequences. This includes political objections about incentives and productivity, an objection that if equality is desirable then it is desirable to lower the condition of those who have more even when this does not objectively aid those who have less, and objections that egalitarianism is motivated by envy.
Engaging in redistribution to pursue the aim of 3 is incompatible with 1. For example, pursuing 3 violates rights that follow from 1. The relationship between egalitarianism and global justice. Does egalitarianism apply to the global community of humanity, or only within particular states?
If it does not apply globally, is this a justified deference to the moral value of specific political attachments, a temporary compromise on the way to a more defensible form of egalitarianism, or is it simply unjustifiable favoritism? Resources Resources are things one can possess or use. She does not treat it as timeless or the final word: Life—capable of living a normal lifespan. Bodily Health—health, nutrition, shelter. Bodily Integrity—movement, security against violence, choice in reproduction, sexual satisfaction.
Senses, imagination, thought—the exercise of these capacities in a fully human sense, facilitated by education and protected by rights of expression, religion, and so forth. Emotions—emotional development allowing one to form attachments. Practical reason—development, critical reflection upon, and pursuit of a conception of a good human life.
Affiliation—social interaction, the social bases of self-respect. Other species—living with and showing concern for the natural world. Primary Goods We now turn to an influential variation on resource egalitarianism. Equality of Opportunity What if there are dramatic inequalities in the opportunities for choice, education, and careers? Anti-Egalitarianism An obvious form of anti-egalitarianism rejects the descriptive thesis. Sufficiency vs.
Equality There is also a sufficiency objection to strictly equalizing views. Frankfurt objects that The mistaken belief that economic equality is important in itself leads people to detach the problem of formulating their economic ambitions from the problem of understanding what is most fundamentally significant to them.
Frankfurt A person focused on strict egalitarianism evaluates their own life and holdings based on something impersonal and independent of the particular features of their own lives and their own personal needs. Frankfurt The case for egalitarianism is usually only a case against poverty. Frankfurt Defenders of equality must show that substantive distributive justice is not captured by concerns over sufficiency alone.
Domestic or Global? An attack on contemporary egalitarian theory in general and luck egalitarianism in particular. Provides a defense of democratic equality. Anderson, Elizabeth S. Arneson, Richard J. Important defense of luck egalitarianism. Barry, Nicholas. Blake, Michael. Egalitarian obligations hold within particular states, not globally.
Cavanagh, Matt. Against Equality of Opportunity. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cohen, Gerald A. Rescuing Justice and Equality.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Cohen, Joshua. Dworkin, Ronald. Part 1: Equality of Welfare. Part 2: Equality of Resources. Useful discussion of different metrics of equality. Elster, Jon. Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Feinberg, Joel. Fleurbaey, Marc. Frankfurt, Harry. Freeman, Samuel. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Harsanyi, John C. Hurley, Susan. Justice, Luck, and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kagan, Shelly. Pojman and Owen McLeod. New York: — The Geometry of Desert. New York: Oxford University Press.
Desert-based conception of distributive justice. Knight, Carl. Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Egalitarianism. New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality – Edited by Nils Holtug and Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen. Marc Fleurbaey. Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality [Nils Holtug, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen] on lirodisa.tk *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers.
Knight, Carl, and Zofia Stemplowska, eds. Responsibility and Distributive Justice.
But this distinction raises perplexing empirical questions. Those theories of distributive justice address equality among the holdings of different individuals. What if the person experiences higher level of welfare in pursuit of an idiosyncratic end rather than securing the objective necessities for survival? One could uphold both ideals even if they sometimes conflict. The most far-reaching skepticism on this point denies that personal responsibility can be more than instrumentally valuable, a tool for securing other values. That the state holds coercive power over the citizens means that they should each be treated equally and, perhaps, that the state should engage in redistribution to pursue equality of holdings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy. Lake, Christopher. Equality and Responsibility. Miller, Richard W. A defense of domestic prioritization in redistribution. Nagel, Thomas. Equality and Partiality. Nagel argues that obligations of egalitarian justice only extend as far as a scheme of enforcement, which typically extends only throughout a particular state.
New York: Cambridge University Press. Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic books. A libertarian affirmation of the equality of all persons and rejection of redistribution aiming at greater equality. Nussbaum, Martha C. Sex and Social Justice. Otsuka, Michael. Libertarianism Without Inequality. A reconciliation of libertarianism and substantive distributive justice. Parfit, Derek. Equality or Priority. First presented at the Lindley Lectures, November 21 Lawrence: University of Kansas. Piketty, Thomas. Capital in the Twenty-First Century.
Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Belknap Press. Pogge, Thomas W. Realizing Rawls. Rakowski, Eric. Equal Justice. Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Roemer, John E.