Psikhologiia kak obiektivnaia nauika [Psychology as an objective science]. Moscow: Institut Prakticheskoi Psikhologii. Afterword in J. Flavell, Geneticheskaja psikhologija Zh. Piazhe [Developmental psychology of J. Piaget] pp. Psikhologicheskij analiz sovremennoj metodiki obuchenija nachalnim matematicheskim ponjatijam [Psychological analysis of methods of teaching concepts in elementary mathematics]. Eksperimentalnoe formirovanie vnimaniya [Experimental formation of attention]. Formation of elementary geometrical concepts and their dependance on directed participation of the pupils.
Oxford: Pergamon Press. Who is in charge? Free will and the science of the brain. Gergely, G. Early socio-emotional development: contingency perception and the social- biofeedback model. Gergen, K. The acculturated brain. Glick, J. Culture and Psychology, 19 4 , Greenfield, P. A theory of the teacher in the learning activities of everyday life. Lave Eds. Gibson, J. The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Gilbert, S. Dobzhansky, Waddington, and Schmalhausen: Embryology and the modern synthesis. Adams Ed. Gold, I. A neuron doctrine in the philosophy of neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22 5 , Gottlieb, G. Individual development and evolution: The genesis of novel behavior. Developmental-behavioral initiation of evolutionary change. Psychological Review, , Haenen, J.
Halpern, D. Teaching critical thinking for transfer across domains.
ON INCONSTANCY OF MIND (With Active Table of Contents) eBook: John Cassian, Edgar Charles Sumner Gibson: lirodisa.tk: Kindle Store. read online ON INCONSTANCY OF MIND (With Active Table of Contents) file PDF Book only if you are registered here. And also You can download or read.
American Psychologist, 53, — Introduction: The second cognitive revolution. American Behavioral Scientist, 36, The rediscovery of the human mind: The discursive approach. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2, The brain can be thought of as a tool. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 46 3 , Hollan, J. Distributed cognition: Toward a new foundation for human-computer interaction research.
Transactions on Computer-Human Interaction, 7, Hruby, G. Three requirements for justifying an educational neuroscience. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 82 1 , Hedegaard, M. The ZPD as basis for instruction. Martin, K. Tobach Eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Activity theory and history teaching. Punamaeki Eds , Perspectives on activity theory. Learning and child development: A Cultural-historical study. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. Hedegaard , M. Humboldt, W. On the diversity of human language construction and its influence on the mental development of human species.
Original work published Humphrey, N. How to solve the mind—body problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, 5— Hurley, S. Consciousness in action. Hutchins, E. Cognition in the wild. Huttenlocher, P. Neural plasticity: The effect of environment on the development of cerebral cortex. Jablonka, E. The systems of inheritance. Oyama, P. Gray Eds. Jakobson, R. On language. Edited by L.
James, W. The principles of psychology, Vol. New York: Holt. Jaynes, J. The origin of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind. Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley. Jarrett, C. Great myths of the brain. Joldersma, C. Neuroscience, education, and a radical embodiment model of mind and cognition. Mayo Ed. Ilyenkov, E. Shkola dolzhna uchit myslit [Schools must teach thinking]. Janet, P. Paris: Flammarion. Kabanova, O. Osnovnye voprosy metodiki obuchenya inostrannomu yaziku na osnove kontseptsii upravleniya usvoeniem [Methodology of teaching foreign language based on the concept of guided knowledge acquisition].
Kandell, E. In search of memory: The emergence of a new science of mind. New York: W. Reductionism in art and brain science: Bridging the two cultures. Kaptelinin, V. Acting with technology: Activity theory and interaction design. Karpov, Yu. The Neo-Vygotskian approach to child development. Karpov, Y. American Psychologist, 53, 27— Karpova, S.
The realization of the verbal composition of speech by preschool children. The Hague: Mouton. Original work published Karpova, S. Galperin Ed. Keller, H. Culture and cognition: Developmental perspective. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. Kozulin, A. School Psychology International, 16, — Psychological tools: A sociocultural approach to education. Methods of psychological research with apes. New York: Liveright Publishing. Original work published Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition Culture and cognitive development.
Mussen Ed. New York: Wiley. Lantolf, J. Sociocultural theory and second language development. Williams Eds. New York: Routledge. Latash, M. Nadin Ed. Lave, J. Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation. Lawrence, J. Conceptual roots of internalization: From transition to transformation. Human Development, 36 3 ; Making personal sense: An account of basic internalization and externalization processes. Theory and Psychology, 13 6 , Lemke, J.
Talking science: Language, learning and values. Norwood NJ: Ablex Publishing. Articulating communities: Sociocultural perspectives on science education. Journal of Research in Science Teaching, 38 3 , Lengrenzi, P. Neuromania: On the limits of brain science. Lebesgue, H. Lerman, S. The social turn in mathematics education research. Lerner, G. Psikhologiya vospriyatiya prostranstvennikh form [Psychology of the perception of spatial forms]. Leiman, M.
The concept of sign in the work of Vygotsky, Winnicott, and Bakhtin: Further integration of object relations theory and activity theory. Leontiev, A. Deiatelnyi um [The active mind]. Moscow: Smysl. Problems of the development of mind. Original work published Leontiev, A.
Deiatelnost, soznanie, lichnost [Activity, consciousness, personality]. Zinchenko, A. Petrovskij Eds. Izbrannie psihologicheskie proizvedenija [A. Selected psychological works] Vol. Primitive mentality. Boston: Beacon Press. Original work published Lickliter, R. A developmental evolutionary framework for psychology. Review of General Psychology, 17, — Biology, development, and human systems. Lerner Ed. The role of development in evolutionary change: A view from comparative psychology. International Journal of Comparative Psychology, 19, Lisina, M.
Potrebnost v obschenii [The need for communication]. In Lisina M. Litowitz, B. Commentary on A. Perinat and M. Lyra, M. On abbreviation: Dialogue in early life. International Journal for Dialogical Science, 2, Lompscher, J.
Problems and results of experimental research on the formation of theoretical thinking through instruction. Motivation and activity. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 14, 11— Lompscher , J. Lernkultur und Kompetenzentwicklung aus kulturhistoricher Sicht: Lernen Erwachsener im Arbeitsprozess [Learning culture and competence development in a cultural— historical perspective: Adult learning in the process of work]. Berlin: Lehmanns Media. Maksimov, L. Zavisimost razvitya matematicheskogo mishleniya shkolnikov ot haraktera obucheniya [The character of teaching-learning and the development of mathematical thinking in schoolchildren].
Voprosy Psikhologii, 2, 57— Malov, S. Usloviya obrazovaniya visshikh edinits dvigatelnogo navyka [Development of high-order motor skills]. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Moscow State University. Mandler, J. How to build a baby: II. Conceptual primitives. Psychological Review, 99, Markus, G.
Neuroscience fiction. The New Yorker, November 30, Marshall, P. Relating psychology and neuroscience: Taking up challenges. Perspectives on psychological science, 4 2 , Marshall, S. Schemas in problem solving. Marx, C. The German Ideology. McLellan Ed. Original work published Mashburn, A. Child Development, 79, Mausfeld, R. On some unwarranted tacit assumptions in cognitive neuroscience. Frontiers in Psychology, v. What we thought we knew and how we came to know it: Four decades of cross-cultural research from a Piagetian point of view.
Human Development, 51, McDowell, J. McTighe, J. Cueing thinking in the classroom: The promise of theory embedded tools. Educational Leadership, 45, 18— Matusov, E. The theory of developmental learning activity in education: Dialectics of the learning content. Culture and Psychology, 7 2 , — McCabe, D.
Seeing is believing: The effect of brain images as judgments of scientific reasoning. Cognition, , — Mead, G. Mind, self and society. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Miller, G. Growing pains for fMRI. Science Magazine, , Minick, N. Carton Eds. Vygotsky: Vol. Problems of general psychology pp. New York: Plenum. Minskaya, G. Formirovanie ponyatiya chisla na osnove izucheniya otnosheniya velichin [Formation of the concept of number on the basis of comparison of quantities].
Davydov Eds. Morrison, A. Primacy and recency effects as indices of the focus of attention. Moll, I. Reclaiming the natural line in Vygotsky's theory of cognitive development. Human Development, 37, Morse, S. Brain overclaim syndrome and criminal responsibility: A diagnostic note. Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 3, Mozes, E. The dogmatic determinism of Daniel Dennett. New Ideas in Psychology, 18, The body in action: Perspective on embodiment and development.
Overton, U. Newman Eds. New York: Erlbaum. How to grow a baby: A reevaluation of image-schema and Piagetian action approaches to representation. Human Development, 41, Reframing a constructivist model of the development of mental representation: The role of higher-order operations.
Developmental Review, 18, — Culture and Psychology, 19 4 , — Nelson, K. Concept, word, and sentence: Interrelations in acquisition and development. Psychological Review, 81, Language in cognitive development: The emergence of the mediated mind. Young minds in social worlds: Experience, meaning, and memory. Newman, D. The construction zone. Action in perception. Out of our heads: Why you are not your brain, and other lessons from the biology of consciousness.
Do real numbers really move? Language, thought, and gesture: The embodied cognitive foundations of mathematics. Iida, F. Pfeifer, L. Kunyoshi, Eds. New York: Springer. Obukhova, L. Formirovanie sistemy fizicheskikh ponjatii v primenenii k resheniyu zadach [Formation of physical concepts in the process of problem solving]. Obukhova Galperin i J. Piaget: dva podhoda k probleme psikhologicheskogo razvitiia rebenka [P. Galperin and J. Piaget: Two approaches to child mental development].
Burmenskaya Eds. Moscow: Gardariki. First published Olson, D. Technology and intelligence in a literate society. Preiss Eds. Orestov, R. Formirovanie professionalnoi orientirovki visokokvalifitsirovannikh rabotchikh [Formation of professional orientation in industrial workers]. Osipova, N. Formation of attention in mentally retarded schoolchildren. Overton, W. Developmental psychology: Philosophy, concepts, and methodology.
Lerner Eds. Developmental perspectives on embodiment and consciousness. New York, NY: Erlbaum. Palincsar, A. Reciprocal teaching of comprehension-fostering and comprehension- monitoring activities. Cognition and Instruction, 1, — Pantina, N. Formirovanie dvigatelnogo navika pisma v zavisimosti ot tipa orientirovki v zadanii [Formation of writing skills in relation to the type of orientation in the task].
Voprosy Psikhologii, 4, — Penrose, R. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Perinat, A. The ontogenesis of meaning: An interactional approach. Mind, Culture, and Activity, 6, Perkins, D. Outsmarting IQ: The emerging science of learnable intelligence. Perkins, David N. Smart schools: Better thinking and learning for every child. Teaching intelligence. Piaget The psychology of intelligence. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Original work published Piaget, J. The origins of intelligence in children.
New York: International University Press. London: Routledge. Osterrieth Ed. Paris: Presses Univer. Piaget, J. The child and reality: Problems of genetic psychology. London: Frederick Muller. Original work published Pinker, S. Blank Slate: The modern denial of human nature. New York: Penguin Books. Pinker, S. How the mind works.
First published Podolskij, A. Formirovanie simultannogo opoznaniya [Formation of simultaneous identification]. Podolskij, A.
Stanovlenie poznavatelnogo deistviia: Nauchnaia abstraktsiia i realnost [The development of cognitive action: Scientific abstraction and reality]. Bridging a gap between psychology and instructional practice. Ifethaler, P. Spector Eds. I have the roving mind of the title, as well as an easy touch at the typewriter or word-processor , and editors have found that out. The result is that although, left to myself, I would in any case deal with a wide variety of subjects, I am forced to extend myself even further by the suggestions of pleasant people who want to fill the pages of their magazines with matters they consider both important and of interest to their readers.
I might, of course, turn them down and, with an austere smile, do whatever it is I would do if I weren't being prodded. There are, unfortunately, two reasons why I do not do this. First, I am the softest touch in the world. A little bit of flattery, a few words to the effect that only I am skilled enough to deal with the subject properly or that only I am professional enough to get it in by deadlines and I will accede to anything. And if it happens that an adequate fee is mentioned, that doesn't hurt either.
I am far too noble a soul, of course, to have the slightest regard for money, but there are numerous crass and vulgar people in the world who expect money in return for goods and services and whose bills drop softly, repeatedly, and punctually into my letterbox. It is for their sake, and not for mine, that I ever allow the subject of financial remuneration to arise.
The highest endeavour of the mind, and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. In proportion as the mind is more capable of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, it desires more to understand things by that kind. From this third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence.
The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge. Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity. Our mind, in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, has to that extent necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God, and is conceived through God.
The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal. The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge, is eternal. The mind is, only while the body endures, subject to those emotions which are attributable to passions. The intellectual love of the mind towards God is that very love of God whereby God loves himself, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he can be explained through the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.
There is nothing in nature, which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can take it away. In proportion as the mind understands more things by the second and third kind of knowledge, it is less subject to those emotions which are evil, and stands in less fear of death. He, who possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal.
In proportion as each thing possesses more of perfection, so is it more active, and less passive; and, vice versa, in proportion as it is more active, so is it more perfect. Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still consider as of primary importance piety and religion, and generally all things which, in Part IV. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; neither do we rejoice therein, because we control our lusts, but, contrariwise, because we rejoice therein, we are able to control our lusts. A T length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom.
I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. It is no part of my design to point out the method and means whereby the understanding may be perfected, nor to show the skill whereby the body may be so tended, as to be capable of the due performance of its functions. The latter question lies in the province of Medicine, the former in the province of Logic.
Here, therefore, I repeat, I shall treat only of the power of the mind, or of reason; and I shall mainly show the extent and nature of its dominion over the emotions, for their control and moderation. That we do not possess absolute dominion over them, I have already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them: and this someone endeavoured to illustrate by the example if I remember rightly of two dogs, the one a house-dog and the other a hunting-dog.
For by long training it could be brought about, that the house-dog should become accustomed to hunt, and the hunting-dog to cease from running after hares. To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. He asserted, that this gland is so suspended in the midst of the brain, that it could be moved by the slightest motion of the animal spirits: further, that this gland is suspended in the midst of the brain in as many different manners, as the animal spirits can impinge thereon; and, again, that as many different marks are impressed on the said gland, as there are different external objects which impel the animal spirits towards it; whence it follows, that if the will of the soul suspends the gland in a position, wherein it has already been suspended once before by the animal spirits driven in one way or another, the gland in its turn reacts on the said spirits, driving and determining them to the condition wherein they were, when repulsed before by a similar position of the gland.
He further asserted, that every act of mental volition is united in nature to a certain given motion of the gland. For instance, whenever anyone desires to look at a remote object, the act of volition causes the pupil of the eye to dilate, whereas, if the person in question had only thought of the dilatation of the pupil, the mere wish to dilate it would not have brought about the result, inasmuch as the motion of the gland, which serves to impel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve in a way which would dilate or contract the pupil, is not associated in nature with the wish to dilate or contract the pupil, but with the wish to look at remote or very near objects.
He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. For passions as defined by him are "perceptions, or feelings, or disturbances of the soul, which are referred to the soul as species, and which mark the expression are produced, preserved, and strengthened through some movement of the spirits. But, seeing that we can join any motion of the gland, or consequently of the spirits, to any volition, the determination of the will depends entirely on our own powers; if, therefore, we determine our will with sure and firm decisions in the direction to which we wish our actions to tend, and associate the motions of the passions which we wish to acquire with the said decisions, we shall acquire an absolute dominion over our passions.
Such is the doctrine of this illustrious philosopher in so far as I gather it from his own words ; it is one which, had it been less ingenious, I could hardly believe to have proceeded from so great a man. Indeed, I am lost in wonder, that a philosopher, who had stoutly asserted, that he would draw no conclusions which do not follow from self-evident premises, and would affirm nothing which he did not clearly and distinctly perceive, and who had so often taken to task the scholastics for wishing to explain obscurities through occult qualities, could maintain a hypothesis, beside which occult qualities are commonplace.
What does he understand, I ask, by the union of the mind and the body? What clear and distinct conception has he got of thought in most intimate union with a certain particle of extended matter?
Truly I should like him to explain this union through its proximate cause. But he had so distinct a conception of mind being distinct from body, that he could not assign any particular cause of the union between the two, or of the mind itself, but was obliged to have recourse to the cause of the whole universe, that is to God. Further, I should much like to know, what degree of motion the mind can impart to this pineal gland, and with what force can it hold it suspended? For I am in ignorance, whether this gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions, which we have closely united with firm decisions, cannot be again disjoined therefrom by physical causes; in which case it would follow that, although the mind firmly intended to face a given danger, and had united to this decision the motions of boldness, yet at the sight of the danger the gland might become suspended in a way, which would preclude the mind thinking of anything except running away.
In truth, as there is no common standard of volition and motion, so is there no comparison possible between the powers of the mind and the power or strength of the body; consequently the strength of one cannot in any wise be determined by the strength of the other. We may also add, that there is no gland discoverable in the midst of the brain, so placed that it can thus easily be set in motion in so many ways, and also that all the nerves are not prolonged so far as the cavities of the brain. Lastly, I omit all the assertions which he makes concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premisses are false.
Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.
Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas in the mind takes place according to the order and association of modifications of the body II. If, therefore, we form a clear and distinct idea of a given emotion, that idea will only be distinguished from the emotion, in so far as it is referred to the mind only, by reason II. But to conceive a thing as free can be nothing else than to conceive it simply, while we are in ignorance of the causes whereby it has been determined to action II.
Wherefore, the emotion, which is referred to the thing which we regard as absent, is not of a nature to overcome the rest of a man's activities and power IV. But an emotion which springs from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things see the def.
Though these effects may seem minor, this type a receptor results in large multiplicative signaling cascades within cells. Very efficient eyes long antedate humanity itself. To practice centering the mind is to build a home for yourself: Momentary concentration khanika samadhi is like a house roofed with thatch; threshold concentration upacara samadhi , a house roofed with tile; and fixed penetration appana samadhi , a house built out of brick. Thus, what we see is a spatiotemporally spread object that spans 67 years. In this regard, it is both remarkable and instructive that, until the second half of the 19th cen- tury, it was not known whether a galloping horse lifted all four hooves off the ground at any one time - only brief-exposure photography provided an answer Crary ; Carroll The mind is simply forced to be quiet until it attains the stage of fixed penetration. People with some sense of decorum find blatant pornography unpleasant and even disgusting and fear its effect on the young, the uneducated, and the mentally unstable.
Wherefore an emotion of this kind always remains the same; and consequently V. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power III. Lastly, this emotion III. So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order. So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things IV. Wherefore it may more readily happen, that we should contemplate other things in conjunction with these than in conjunction with something else, and consequently II.
This love towards God must hold the chief place in the mind. Again, God cannot pass either to a greater or to a lesser perfection I. No one can hate God. He, who loves God, cannot endeavour that God should love him in return. Thus it cannot imagine anything for definition of Imagination, see II. This essence, therefore, must necessarily be conceived through the very essence of God I.